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Abstract
In this paper we analyze the e¤ects of environmental policies on the size distribution of rms.
We model a stationary industry where the observed size distribution is a solution to the prot
maximization problem of heterogeneous rms that di¤er in terms of their energy e¢ ciency. We
compare the equilibrium size distribution under emission taxes, uniform emission standards, and
performance standards. Our results indicate that, unlike emission taxes and performance stan-
dards, emission standards introduce regulatory asymmetries favoring small rms. These asym-
metries cause signicant detrimental e¤ects on total output and total welfare, yet lead to reduced
emissions and help preserve small businesses.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, several environmental regulations have been introduced to control emissions of several
pollutants. These policies have a clear objective: to induce rms to reduce emissions by investing
in cleaner/energy-saving technologies and promoting industrial turnover by modifying, among other
things, the possibility of entry of new rms, exit of incumbent rms, and the relative competitive
advantage of active rms. Environmental regulations may also a¤ect the distribution of market shares
and the related size distribution of rms if compliance changes the optimal plant size. As pointed out
by Evans (1986), the di¤erential e¤ect of regulation across rm size is important since society may
have an interest in preserving small businesses because of antitrust or other noneconomic reasons.
When there are scale economies in regulatory compliance, it might be optimal to exempt or impose
lighter regulatory burden on smaller rms, or design regulations that are neutral across rm size to
minimize the disproportionate impact of environmental regulatory requirements on small businesses
(see also Brock and Evans 1985). The incidence of regulatory costs across rm size may also tell
us something about the interest of certain groups of businesses in supporting alternative regulatory
policies.
The size distribution of rms has been extensively studied in the industrial organization literature.
Most of the literature deals with the distributional properties of rm size (see, e.g., Cabral and
Mata 2003 and Angelini and Generale 2008). However, more recent research has integrated the size
distribution of rms into standard economic theory. Attempts to explain the size dynamics have
investigated the e¤ects of bad productivity shocks (Hopenhayn 1992 and Ericson and Pakes 1995),
learning (Jovanovic 1982), ine¢ ciencies in nancial markets (Clementi and Hopenhayn 2006), the
exogenous distribution of managerial ability in the population (Lucas 1978 and Garicano and Rossi-
Hansberg 2004), and the e¢ cient accumulation and allocation of factors of production (Rossi-Hansberg
and Wright 2007).
In the environmental economics literature, some studies have identied two counteracting e¤ects
through which environmental policies a¤ect the distribution of size. First, the studies by Pashigian
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(1984), Dean et al. (2000), and Sengupta (2010) indicate that due to economies of scale, environmental
regulation modies the optimal scale of rms and puts small rms at a unit cost disadvantage. Second,
Becker et al. (2013) argue that there are statutory and/or enforcement asymmetries that favor smaller
establishments. Hence, the nal incidence of environmental regulations depends on whether these
regulatory asymmetries outweigh any scale economies in regulatory compliance. In this paper, we
study the e¤ects of the choice of policy instruments on the size distribution of rms. We nd that
the relative magnitude of these two e¤ects is quite dependent on the type of environmental policies
in place since di¤erent environmental policies redistribute intra-industry rents di¤erently. Moreover,
over time, di¤erent regulations might lead to a di¤erent distribution of the share of polluting inputs
in the production process as they foster investments in di¤erent advanced technologies to di¤erent
extents.
To study the e¤ects of the choice of policy instruments on the size distribution of rms, we follow
the seminal model by Lucas (1978), where the underlying size distribution of rms in the industry is
the result of the existence of a productive factor of heterogenous productivity. In Lucasmodel, such
a factor is the managerial technology, while in ours it is the energy e¢ ciency of rms.1 In such a
setting, we introduce di¤erent environmental policies and analyze the resulting size distributions, as
well as the variations in size distribution that arise as a result of investments that reduce the cost of
compliance with environmental regulations. The heterogeneity of the available physical capital with
respect to energy intensity is well established in the literature. Small rms typically spend more of
their operating costs on energy than do large rms due to the lack of knowledge about and expected
protability of available energy-e¢ cient technologies (de Groot at al. 2001 and Ruth et al. 2004).
We compare three environmental policies, namely emission taxes, emission standards, and per-
formance standards. As shown in the paper, under emission taxes and performance standards, the
intensity of emissions is determined by the stringency of the regulation and it is the same across
1Our model also resembles that of Melitz (2003), who derives a simple model of industry equilibrium in an open
economy with heterogeneous rms. Firms di¤er in terms of their marginal productivity of labor (the only factor of
production). The productivity of each rm is randomly drawn from some distribution, but unlike our model, rms do
not know their productivity prior to starting production. One of the predictions of the Melitz model is that opening up
to trade will increase aggregate productivity.
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rms. In contrast, under emission standards, the regulatory goal is expressed as an absolute emission
limit, which favors smaller rms as the limit might not bind their emissions. Our results indicate that
emission taxes and performance standards do not introduce regulatory asymmetries, but do modify
the optimal scale of the rms. Moreover, the existence of economies of scale implies that these policies
reduce to a lower extent prots for larger rms than for smaller rms. Further, emission taxes reduce
the prots of larger rms to a larger extent than performance standards. However, when it comes to
emission standards, the incidence of the regulatory costs across rm size depends on the two coun-
teracting e¤ects described above. In line with Becker et al. (2013), our results indicate that emission
standards create regulatory asymmetries as they distort the emission intensity of large rms the most.
This e¤ect is likely to exceed the economies of scale e¤ect, implying that emission standards reduce
the prots of large rms to a larger extent. Finally, unlike previous studies suggesting that market-
based instruments create more e¤ective technology adoption incentives than conventional regulatory
standards,2 our results indicate that when the regulatory asymmetries created by emissions standards
are taken into account, the protability of emission saving biased technological change is higher under
emission standards than under market-based instruments.
The paper is organized in six sections. The next section presents the model and the underlying
size distribution of rms in the absence of environmental policies. The third section analyzes the
incidence of regulatory costs across size and how the choice of a policy instrument modies the size
distribution of rms. The fourth section analyzes the e¤ects of the choice of policy instruments on
the share of the polluting input and technological choice. The fth section presents some numerical
simulations and analyzes welfare implications. The nal section concludes.
2 The Model
We assume a perfectly competitive stationary industry consisting of a continuum of risk-neutral single-
plant polluting rms of mass 1. Firms produce a homogeneous good using two inputs: energy (e)
2There is a large body of research analyzing the incentives provided by di¤erent environmental policy instruments
for adoption of advanced abatement technology. See Requate (2005) for a review.
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and labor (l). Moreover, each unit of energy e used as an input generates  units of emissions , i.e.,
i = ei. Firms di¤er in terms of the parameter , which reects energy e¢ ciency and is assumed to
be uniformly distributed on the interval

; 

.
Assuming a CobbDouglas technology, the production function of rm i is then characterized as:
q(i; e; l) =  [iei]

li _ ;  > 0; +  < 1; (1)
where q is the amount of output produced by a rm using e units of energy and l units of labor, i is
the energy e¢ ciency of rm i, and  is a technology index. In the absence of environmental regulation,
rm i maximizes net prots NRi through the choice of inputs:
max
ei;li
NRi = p [iei]

li   wli   zei   F; (2)
where w and z are the equilibrium wage rate and energy price, respectively. p represents the
output price, and F corresponds to a xed cost. The rst order conditions (FOCs) are given by:
pi e
 1
i l

i = z; (3)
pi ei
l 1i = w: (4)
Dividing by parts, we obtain:
eNRi
lNRi
=
w
z
: (5)
Substituting equation (5) in the FOCs, we can solve for eNRi and l
NR
i as:
eNRi =
h
pw 1 z [1 ]i
i 1
1  
; (6)
lNRi =
h
p1 w (1 )z i
i 1
1  
: (7)
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We assume that 2+  < 1, which means that the demand of energy is a concave function of the
energy e¢ ciency.
Replacing equations (6) and (7) in equations (1) and (2), we can solve for individual output and
prots as:
qNRi =
h
p+w z 
i 1
1  


1  
i ; (8)
NRi = [1    ]
h
pi 
w z 
i 1
1     F: (9)
From equations (8) and (9), it is possible to see that output and prots increase as energy e¢ ciency
i increases. Firm i would operate in this market as long as its prots are larger than F . Consis-
tent with this, in the continuum of rms the minimum energy e¢ ciency NR0 satises the condition
NR(0) = F , or:
NR0 =
"
F 1  zw
p [1    ]1  
# 1

: (10)
Thus, the energy e¢ ciency of the rms operating in the market is uniformly distributed on the
interval
h
NR0 ; 
i
, where NR0  . Note that NR0 is an increasing function of the inputs prices z
and w and a decreasing function of the output price p and the technology index . Moreover, the
existence of the cost F implies economies of scale since large rms can spread the xed cost across
more output units than small rms.
We can compute aggregate emissions in the absence of environmental regulation NR by integrating
individual emissions i over the range
h
NR0 ;

i
, which leads to:
NR = 
Z 
NR0
h
pw 1 z [1 ]
i 1
1  


1  
i d: (11)
Let h = 1 1   > 1 and k1 =
h
pw 1 z [1 ]
i 1
1  
. The solution to equation (11) can be
represented as:
NR =
k1
h


h  
h
NR0
ih
: (12)
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To compute total output with no regulation QNR, we integrate (8) over the interval
h
NR0 ;

i
,
which leads to:
QNR =
z
p
NR :
Dividing individual emissions eNRi by individual output q
NR
i , we can see individual emission
intensity in the absence of environmental regulations correspond to pz : Note that it coincides with
the average emission intensity NR =QNR. Moreover, (individual and average) emission intensity is
a decreasing function of the price of energy z. It is also an increasing function of the share of energy
in the production process  and of the output price p. Furthermore, the lower the coe¢ cient , the
lower the emission intensity.
3 Environmental Regulation
Let us now analyze the e¤ects of environmental policies on the size distribution in equilibrium. We
assume that given the initial size distribution of rms, the regulatory goal is to limit aggregate emis-
sions at some exogenously given level E by means of one of the following three regulatory instruments:
a per-unit emission tax  , a uniform emission standard , and a uniform performance standard that
denes the maximum intensity of emissions . Finally, we assume that the stringency of each policy
remains unchanged regardless of the e¤ects of the instruments on the initial size distribution of rms.
Emission Taxes
In the case of emission taxes, rm i maximizes its prots Ti :
max
ei;li
Ti = p [iei]

li   wli   [z + b ] ei   F; (13)
where b =  is the tax per unit of energy.
The FOCs are:
pi e
 1
i l

i = z + b ; (14)
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pi e

i l
 1
i = w: (15)
Dividing by parts, we obtain:3
eTi
lTi
=
w
 [z + b ] : (16)
Substituting equation (16) in the FOCs, we can solve for eTi and l
T
i as:
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eTi =
h
pw 1  [z + b ] [1 ] i i 11   : (17)
lTi =
h
p1 w (1 ) [z + b ]  i i 11   : (18)
Replacing equations (17) and (18) in equations (1) and (13), we can solve for individual output
and prots as:
qTi =
h
p+w  [z + b ] i 11    1  i ; (19)
Ti = [1    ]
h
pi 
w  [z + b ] i 11     F: (20)
The cuto¤ value of the energy e¢ ciency in the case of taxes T0 satises the condition 
T
0 (0) = F ,
which yields:
T0 =
"
F 1   [z + b ] w
p [1    ]1  
# 1

: (21)
By simple inspection of equations (10) and (21), it is easy to see that _ b > 0, T0 > NR0 .
Moreover, as in the previous case, we can compute aggregate emissions and output under taxes
(T ; QT ) by integrating individual emissions and output over the range
h
T0 ;

i
, which leads to:
T = k2
Z 
T0


1  
i d =
k2
h


h  
h
T0
ih
: (22)
3Compared with equation (5), we can see that the use of energy per unit of labor is lower _ b 6= 0.
4As in the previous case, we analyze the case where the optimal use of energy is a concave function of the energy
e¢ ciency:
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QT =
[z + b ] T
p
; (23)
where k2 =
h
pw 1  [z + b ] [1 ]i 11   .
Thus, the average emission intensity in the industry correspond to 
T
QT
= pz+b . Dividing individual
emissions eTi by individual output q
T
i , we can see that individual emission intensity also corresponds
to pz+b . Note that with regard to the situation with no regulation, the average emission intensity
of the industry is decreased under taxes. Moreover, like in the case with no regulation, the emission
intensity of each rm in the industry is the same at the margin and given by the price ratio of emissions
to output. Before the imposition of the regulation, rms whose energy e¢ ciency was lower than T0
earned positive prots, but they did not take the social externality cost into consideration. The tax on
emissions corrects the divergence between private and social incentives by forcing rms whose energy
e¢ ciency is in the range
h
NR0 ; 
T
0
h
out of business.
Let Ti = 
NR
i  Ti > 0 represent the gap in prots under emissions taxation vis-a-vis no regulation.
Substracting equation (20) from equation (9), it is easy to show that Ti is given by:
Ti = [1    ]
h
pw 
i 1
1  


1  
i
h
z
 
1     [z + b ]  1   i : (24)
Moreover, let Ti =
Ti
NRi
> 0 represent the percentage reduction in rm is prots under emis-
sions taxation vis-a-vis no regulation. To study the incidence of the regulatory costs of environmental
taxation across rm size, we compute the rst and second order derivative of Ti with regard to i,
which leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Emission taxes reduce by a larger percentage prots for smaller rms than for larger
rms.
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Proof. Substituting equation (24) in Ti and di¤erentiating with respect to i yields:
@Ti
@i
=  


1    

F
i
Ti
NRi| {z }
Economies of Scale
< 0
@2Ti
(@i)
2
=


1    
"
FTi
2i
NR
i
+
FTi
i

NRi
2 @NRi@i   FiNRi @
T
i
@i
#
> 0:
Hence, Ti decreases at decreasing rate as i increases, implying that in relative terms, emission
taxes increase the cost of compliance (and thus reduce the prots) of the smaller rms more than
they reduce the prots of larger rms. The intuition behind this result is the existence of economies
of scale. As mentioned before, under emission taxes the energy and emission intensity of each rm in
the industry is the same at the margin. However, in absolute terms, large rms produce more ouput
and release more emissions. The xed cost F puts the smaller rms at a unit cost disadvantage; the
normalized xed cost Fi reects the fact that the percentage reduction in prots of the larger rms
is smaller since they can spread the xed cost across a larger output. The percentage reduction in
prots decreases at a decreasing rate since the use of energy (and emission tax payments) is a concave
function of the energy e¢ ciency.
Emission Standard
Under a uniform emission standard, the government restricts the individual emissions generated
during the production process to the level . In our setting, this restriction is equivalent to a restriction
on the use of the energy input. Thus, rm i maximizes prots given by the constraint i  ; or:
max
ei;li
Si = p [iei]

li   wli   zei   F s:t: ei   1: (25)
Since the standard is uniform and rms are heterogenous, we should expect it to be binding only
for some rms. Taking the case without regulation as the baseline, we should expect the standard to
be binding if NRi  . If the standard is not binding, the choice of inputs proceeds as in the case
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without regulation. If the standard is binding, the FOC wrt li is:
lSi =
"
p

 
w
# 1
1 
; (26)
while the energy to labor ratio is equal to:
eSi
lSi
=
"
 1
1  
w
pi
# 1
1 
: (27)
Substituting lSi and e
S
i in equations (1) and (25) yields to output and prots for those rms for
which the standard is binding:
qSi =
h
pw 
i 1
1  
 1
 
1  

1 
i : (28)
Si = [1  ]
h
pi

 1

w 
i 1
1    z  1  F: (29)
In order to compare environmental policies, we assume that aggregate emissions under the emission
standard and emission tax are equivalent ex-ante. Therefore, we can solve for  by integrating emissions
over the range
h
NR0 ; 
i
and equalizing this to T in equation (22), which leads to the following
condition: Z 
NR0
d =
k2
h


h  
h
T0
ih
:
Therefore, the standard  can be represented as:
 =
k2
h
264 h  
h
T0
ih
  NR0
375 : (30)
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By comparing equations (6) and (30), it is possible to show that there is a critical value b1 that
denes whether the standard  is binding. The critical value b1 corresponds to:
b1 =
264h  z
z + b
264 h  
h
T0
ih
  NR0
375
375
1
h 1
:
Note that b1 is positively related to the length of the interval of the energy e¢ ciency distributionh
NR0 ;

i
, meaning that the more heterogeneous the rms are in terms of the energy e¢ ciency, the
larger the critical value dening whether emission standards are binding.
Regarding the emission intensity, if i 2
h
NR0 ;
b1h, the standard  is not binding and energy used
and output are given by equations (6) and (8), respectively. The average (and individual) emission
intensity in this interval is the same as in the case without regulation and equal to pz . If i 2hb1; i, the standard is binding and individual emissions are equal to . Dividing  by (28) leads to
an individual emission intensity equal to 

1  
1  
1 
h
pw i
i  1
1 
. Note that unlike emission
taxes, under emission standards the individual emission intensity depends on the energy e¢ ciency
parameter i. It decreases as energy e¢ ciency increases at a decreasing rate, implying that large
rms use the input that generates emissions less intensively.
Let Si = 
NR
i   Si > 0 represent the gap in rm is prots under emission standards vis-a-vis
no regulation. Substracting equation (29) from equation (9), it is easy to show that if i > b1, Si is
given by:
Si = [1    ]
h
pw z 
i 1
1  


1  
i   [1  ]
h
pi

 1

w 
i 1
1 
+ z

 1

:
(31)
Moreover, let Si =
Si
NRi
> 0 represent the percentage reduction in rm is prots under emission
standards vis-a-vis no regulation. To study the incidence of the regulatory costs of emission standards
across rm size, we compute the rst and second order derivative of Si with regard to i, which
leads to the following proposition:
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Proposition 2 Emission standards reduce by a larger percentage prots for larger rms than for
smaller rms.
Proof. Substituting equation (31) in Si and di¤erentiating with respect to i yields
@Si
@i
=


1    
264
h
pi

 1

w 
i 1
1    z  1
i
NR
i
375
| {z }
Re gulatory Assymmetry
 


1    

F
i
Si
NRi| {z }
Economies of Scale
> 0: (32)
Hence, the incidence of the regulatory costs of emission standards across rm size depends on two
counteracting e¤ects. The rst e¤ect - regulatory asymmetry (RA)- is positive and captures the fact
that emission standards distort the emission intensity of larger rms the most. Compared with non
regulation (where emission intensity is the same across rms), under emission standards the larger
rms are forced to use the energy input less intensively. Thus, their prots are reduced by a larger
percentage than those of smaller rms.
Like in the case of taxation, the second e¤ect, the scale e¤ect (SE), is negative and captures the
fact that the xed cost F puts the smaller rms at a unit cost disadvantage, and hence, vis-a-vis no
regulation, the prots of the smaller rms are reduced to a larger extent than those of larger rms.
We can show that the regulatory asymmetry e¤ect is larger than the scale e¤ect implying that
prots under emission standards are reduced by a larger percentage for larger rms than for smaller
rms (see appendix A). Moreover, di¤erentiating @
S
i
@i
with respect to i yields:
@2Si
(@i)
2
=

@RA
@i
+
@SE
@i

:
As in the case of taxes we can show that @SE@i > 0. Hence, the scale e¤ect decreases at a decreasing
rate since the use of energy is a concave function of the energy e¢ ciency. The derivative @RA@i is given
by:
@RA
@i
=  

1    
1  

RA
i
  RA
NRi
@NRi
@i
+

2
[1    ] [1  ]
"
z

 1

2i
NR
i
#
< 0:
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That is, if i > b1, the regulatory asymmetry e¤ect increases at an increasing rate as i increases.
Since the rst part of the @
2Si
(@i)
2 is negative and the second part is positive, the sign of the
@2Si
(@i)
2 is
ambiguous.
Performance Standard
Under a performance standard, emission intensity is xed by policy at iqi  . Firms can meet
partly this restriction by reducing emissions in the numerator and partly by increasing output in the
denominator. In our setting, this restriction is equivalent to a restriction on the use of input energy
equal to ei   1qi. Thus, rm i maximizes
max
ei;li
PSi = p(iei)
li   wli   zei   F s.t. ei   1qi:
If the constraint is binding, the choice of the energy input is given by:
ei = 
 1(iei)
li
or:
ePSi =
h
 1i l

i
i 1
1 
; (33)
and the prot maximization problem becomes:
maxPSi =
li
p(ie
PS
i )
li   wli   zePSi : (34)
Substituting equation (33) into equation (34) and solving the FOC wrt li yields:
lPSi =
"
 11 

p 1   z1 
[1  ]1  w1  

i
# 11  
: (35)
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Substituting equation (35) into equation (33), we solve for ePSi as:
ePSi =
"
 1

p 1   z i
[1  ] w
# 1
1  
; (36)
where
ePSi
lPSi
=
[1  ]w
 [p 1   z] : (37)
Finally, substituting lPSi and e
PS
i in (34) yields:
PSi = [1    ]
"
 1

p 1   z
1  
1 
i 
w 
# 1
1  
  F: (38)
As in the case of the emission standard, we assume that aggregate emissions under the performance
standard and the emission tax are equivalent ex-ante. Therefore, the performance standard is equal
to the average emission intensity under taxes and corresponds to  = pz+b : Substituting  in equation
(38) and solving for the cuto¤ value PS0 that satises the condition 
PS
0 (
PS
0 ) = F yields:
PS0 =
"
F 1   [z + b ] [1  ]1  w
p [z [1  ] + b ]1  [1    ]1  
# 1

: (39)
As usual, aggregate emissions under performance standard PS are calculated by integrating
individual emissions PSi over the range
h
PS0 ;

i
, which leads to:
PS =
k2
h

z [1  ] + b
[z + b ] [1  ]
 
1  


h  
h
PS0
ih
: (40)
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Let PSi = 
NR
i   PSi > 0 represent the gap in prots under performance standards vis-a-vis no
regulation. Substracting equation (38) from equation (9), it is easy to show that PSi is given by:
PSi = [1    ]
h
w 
i 1
1  


1  
i
24pz  11     "" 1 p 1   z
1  
1 ## 11  35 :
(41)
Moreover, let PSi =
PSi
NRi
> 0 represent the percentage reduction in rm is prots under
performance standards vis-a-vis no regulation. To study the incidence of the regulatory costs of
emission standards across rm size, we compute the rst and second order derivative of PSi with
regard to i, which leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Performance standards reduce by a larger percentage prots for smaller rms than
for larger rms.
Proof. Substituting equation (41) in PSi and di¤erentiating with respect to i yields:
@PSi
@i
=  


1    

F
i
PSi
NRi| {z }
Economies of Scale
< 0;
@2PS
(@i)
2
=


1    
"
FPSi
2i
NR
i
+
FPSi
i

NRi
2 @NRi@i   FiNRi @
PS
i
@i
#
> 0:
Like in the case of emission taxes, PSi decreases at a decreasing rate as i increases, implying that
in relative terms, performance standards increase the cost of compliance (and thus reduce the prots)
of the larger rms to a lower extent. As in the case of emission taxes, the emission intensity of each
rm in the industry is the same at the margin and given by the regulation. The regressive incidence
of performance standards is explained by the existence of economies of scale. This e¤ect decreases at
a decreasing rate since the use of energy is a concave function of the energy e¢ ciency:
Proposition 4 Emission taxes reduce the prots of larger rms by a larger percentage than do per-
formance standards.
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Proof. The condition
@Ti@i  > @PSi@i  holds if Ti   PSi < 0. Substracting equation (38) from
(20) yields:
Ti  PSi = [1    ]
h
i 
w 
i 1
1  
264hp [z + b ] i 11     " 1 p 1   z
1  
1 # 11   375 :
We can see that Ti   PSi < 0 if p [z + b ]  <  1 hp 1 z1  i1 . Replacing  we have that
this condition simplies to:
b [1  ] < ^;
which is true since 0 <  < 1. Hence, and not surprisingly, emission taxes reduce rm prots by larger
percentage. As pointed out by Fullerton and Heutel (2010) a restriction on emissions per unit of output
is equivalent to a combination of a tax on emissions and subsidy to output. The actual cost of the
regulation is larger under emission taxes since rms must pay the tax for each unit of emissions they
release. Instead, under performance standards, rms are granted qPSi units of emission free of charge.
The higher the level of output qPSi , the larger the amount of emissions granted free of charge. Hence,
as i increases, and so does output, the actual cost of the regulation under performance standard
decreases, implying that vis-a-vis taxation performance standards reduce the prots of larger rms by
a lower percentage than do emission taxes.
Proposition 5 We have the following ranking regarding how environmental policies modify the opti-
mal scale of rms.
(a) The minimum optimal rm size is larger under emission taxes and performance standards than
under no regulation. Further, the minimum optimal rm size is larger under emission taxes than
under performance standards, i.e., NR0 < 
PS
0 < 
T
0 .
(b) There is a critical threshold b1 that denes whether emission standards are binding. Since
b1 > NR0 , it follows that emission standards do not a¤ect the minimum optimal rm size.
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Proof. (a) Comparing equations [10] and [21], it is easy to show that for any ^ > 0; NR0 < 
T
0 .
Comparing equations [21] and [39], it follows that T0 > 
PS
0 if:
[z [1  ] + ^ ]1  > [z +  ]1  [1  ]1  ;
which holds since 0 <  < 1: Hence, NR0 < 
PS
0 < 
T
0 .
As shown above, since emission taxes reduce rm prots by a larger percentage, the marginal
rm in the case of taxation should be more energy e¢ cient than the corresponding one in the case of
performance standards.
(b) We show in page 11 that emission standards are binding only for larger rms. A more formal
proof is provided in the Appendix B.
Finally, since PS0 < 
T
0 , it can be shown that aggregate emissions are higher under performance
standards than under emission taxes, i.e., PS > T . Indeed, PS > T if:
k2
h

z [1  ] + b
[z + b ] [1  ]
 
1  


h  
h
PS0
ih
>
k2
h


h  
h
T0
ih
;
which simplies to:

z [1  ] + b
[z + b ] [1  ]
 
1  


h  
h
PS0
ih
>


h  
h
T0
ih
:
This inequality holds since 
h  
h
PS0
ih
> 
h  
h
T0
ih
and z[1 ]+b[z+b ][1 ] > 1:
4 The Choice of Policy Instruments and the Distribution of
Factors
To analyze the e¤ects of the choice of policy instruments on the distribution of factors, we model the
choice between two technologies. In particular, technology 1 (T1) increases the technology index from
 to ^, while technology 2 (T2) reduces the generation of emissions per unit of energy from  to ~.
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From the analysis above, recall that if the regulations are binding, individual emissions, the energy
to labor ratio and individual emission intensity under emission taxes (T), emission standards (S) and
performance standard (PS) correspond to:
Table 1: Individual Emissions, Energy/Labor Ratio and Emission Intensity
Individual Emissions Energy/Labor Emission Intensity
T 
h
pw 1  [z + ] [1 ] i
i 1
1   w
[z+]
p
z+
S 

 1
 1  
1  pw 1i   11   1   1  1  hpw i i  11 
PS  
[+]
1  

[p 1 z]i
[1 ]w
 1
1  
[1 ]w
[p 1 z] 
Hence, under taxes and performance standards, individual emissions increase when  increases.
However, the rmsrelative use of inputs and emission intensity do not depend on . In contrast,
under emission standards the rms relative use of energy and emission intensity are reduced if 
increases.  has no e¤ect on individual emissions if the standard is binding.
Under taxes and emission standards, T2 increases the rmsrelative use of energy while reducing
the emission intensity (as well as individual emissions in the case of taxes). Finally, under performance
standards, T2 increases individual emissions and the rmsrelative use of energy but has no e¤ect
on the emission intensity, which is xed by the regulation. However, if the adoption of T2 makes
the standard  no-binding, the emission intensity is reduced to pez and the energy to labor ratio is
increased to wz .
All in all, the technologies a¤ect individual emissions, the relative use of inputs, and emission
intensity di¤erently depending on the policy instrument in place. However, for simplicity, let us refer
to T1 as a neutral technical change (which holds for all cases but the emission standards) and T2 as an
emission-saving technological change. Without loss of generality, we assume that both options have
the same investment cost G, and normalize  to 1, meaning that ^ =  and ~ < 1: We also assume
that both technologies are protable and focus instead on the choice of technology to understand how
the distribution of factors is a¤ected by the choice of di¤erent environmental policies.
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Emission Taxes
Let  Ti (^; ) represent rm is prots from adoption of T1. Using equation (20),  
T
i (^; ) can be
represented as:
 Ti (^; ) = [1    ]
h
pi 
w  [z +  ] 
i 1
1  

^
1
1      11  

  :
Prots from adoption of T2 can be represented as  Ti (~; 1):
 Ti (~; 1) = [1    ]
h
pi 
w 
i 1
1 a 
h
[z + ~ ]
 
1     [z +  ]  1  
i
  ;
where ~ = ~, and  = G  F > 0.
From these equations we can show that T1 is most protable when the technology index b exceeds
a critical threshold given by T =
h
z+
z+~
i
. For ^ = T , both technologies are equally protable,
while T2 is more protable if ^ < 

T .
Emission Standards
From equation (29) we can see that if the standard is binding, the prots from adopting T1 can
be represented as:
 Si (^; ) =
h
1   11 
i h
pi

 1

w 
i 1
1 

^
1
1     11 

  :
Prots from adopting T2 can be represented as:
 Si (~; 1) =
h
1   11 
i h
pi

 1

w 
i 1
1 
h
~
 
1    1
i
  :
Like in the previous case, there is critical threshold S = ~
  that denes which technology is
the most protable. T1 is more protable than T2 when ^ > 

S , while the reverse holds for ^ < 

S .
For ^ = S , both technologies are equally protable.
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Performance Standards
Finally, from equation (38) we can see that the prots from adoption of T1 can be represented as:
 PSi (^; ) = [1    ]
"


p 1   z
1  
1 
i 
w 
# 1
1   
^
1
1      11  

  :
Prots from adoption of T2 can be represented as:
 PSi (~; 1) = [1    ]
"
i 
w 
[1  ]1 
# 1
1 a  he 1 p 1e   z1 i 11     hp 1   z1 i 11    :
Again, there is a critical threshold PS = e 1 h z[e ]+ez[1 ]+ i1  that denes which technology is
the most protable. Investment in T1 is more protable than T2 when ^ > 

PS , while the reverse
holds for ^ < PS . For ^ = 

PS , both technologies are equally protable.
Proposition 6 Compared with neutral technological change, the protability of emission-saving tech-
nological change is the highest under emission standards, followed by emission taxes and performance
standards.
Proof. Comparing the thresholds we can show that:
S > 

T if [z + e] > [z +  ] e, which holds since ~ < 1.
S > 

PS if [z +  ] [1 + e] > z, which holds since  < 1.
T > 

PS if e 11  h z+z+e i 1    e 1   >   z[1 ]z[1 ]+ , which holds since z+z+e > 1 > ~.
Hence, it follows that ^
S
> ^
T
> ^
PS
:
This result is interesting. As discussed above, emission standards distort the choice of inputs the
most, a¤ecting quite signicantly the prots of those rms for which the standard is binding. T2
allows rms to increase the use of the energy input, reducing the shadow cost of the regulation. The
nding that T2 is most likely to be adopted under emission standards goes against previous studies
suggesting that market-based instruments create more e¤ective technology adoption incentives than
conventional regulatory standards (see Requate 2005 for a survey). This result relies on the logic that
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under emission standards, the incentive for adoption is given by the increased prots resulting from
using new technology when rms are restricted to emit no more than . In comparison, under market-
based instruments, rms would instead increase their emission reductions even further to reduce tax
payments. Our analysis shows, however, that when the regulatory asymmetries created by emission
standards are taken into account, the protability of emission-saving-biased technological change is
higher under emission standards than under market-based instruments. The most productive rms
are more likely to invest in new technology. Under emission standards they are the rms that face the
larger percentage reduction in prots due to the regulation, and hence benet the most from investing
in T2.
Finally, the nding that adoption of T2 is more likely under emission taxes than under performance
standard is in line with Proposition 4. For equivalent stringencies of these policy instruments, rms
face a larger percentage reduction in prots under emission taxes, which creates incentives to invest
in technologies that reduce the cost of the regulation.
5 Numerical Example
In this section we present a numerical example of the size distribution induced by the di¤erent policies
under analysis. We provide values for some of our key parameters and calculate the resulting choice
of inputs, prots, and aggregate emissions and output.
Table 2: Parameter Values
   p w z  F  ~ N  
0:2 0:5 2 5 1 1:6 0:2 21 1 0:8 50 1 0
The production elasticity of emissions and labor is set at  = 0:2 and  = 0:5; respectively. The
general productivity parameter, ; is equal to 2: The price of the output is set at p = 5; while the
wages and the price of energy are set at w = 1 and z = 1:6; respectively. We set the emission tax at
 = 0:2 and the xed entry cost of rms at F = 21: Finally, we assume that the initial number of
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Figure 1: Distribution of Emissions across the Di¤erent Types of Firms (NR: Non-regulation, T: taxes,
S:emission standards, PS: performance standards)
rms is N = 50, and these rms are uniformly distributed in the interval ]0; 1] , which means that the
upper bound of the distribution is given by  = 1 and the lower bound  ' 0:
Using the parameter values presented in Table 2, we study the size distribution of rms under
di¤erent environmental regulations. Table 3 summarizes the main results. In the case without reg-
ulation, 12 out of 50 rms cannot operate since they are not protable enough. Firms with energy
e¢ ciency lower than  = 0:26 are not protable even in the case of no regulation.
Firms need to be more energy e¢ cient in order to stay in the market if environmental taxes are
imposed. The cuto¤ value in this specic numerical example is 0.3. Hence, the internalization of
the cost of emissions made rms in the interval [0:26; 0:3) exit the market. The case of standards is
di¤erent. For the rms with energy e¢ ciency in the range [0:26; 0:44), the emissions standard is not
binding. Those rms for which the standard is binding, i.e., i 2 [0:44; 1]; produce less than before
since they are restricted in the use of the energy (or equivalently in the generation of emissions),
as illustrated in Figure 1. Finally, the cuto¤ value in the case of performance standards is equal to
0.28, which implies that rms in the interval [0:28; 0:3) will still nd it protable to operate under
performance standards but not under taxes.
When it comes to output, it is clear from Table 3 that output is higher under performance standards
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than under taxation, which is easily explained if we take into account that rms pay taxes for the
total emissions they generate, while in the case of performance standards rms are granted a certain
number of emissions free of charge. The lowest level of total output is observed in the case of emission
standards, since the larger rms that used to produce a lot are now restricted by the regulation. Given
the specic parameter values assumed here, we can rank the total output under the four regimes as
QNR > QPS > QT > QS :
Table 3: Numerical Results
0
b1  Q =Q WI ^
Non-regulation 0:26 584 934 0:63 603
Emission Tax 0:3 465 837 0:56 592 2:0091
Emission Standard 0:26 0:44 450 838 0:53 577 2:0912
Performance Standard 0:28 494 890 0:56 596 2:0003
Table 3 also shows the total emission level in each case, while Figure 1 presents the emissions
generated by each type of rm. To start with the aggregate amount, we have that NR > PS >
T > S : So, emission standards result in lower levels of emissions than taxes and performance
standards. Emission standards lead to the same emission level as with non-regulation when the
standard is not binding, but there is a signicant decrease in the emissions generated by the rms
for which the standard is binding. Compared with taxes, emissions are higher under performance
standards (as expected). Table 3 also shows the average emissions-output ratio. We can see that
the average emission intensity is lowest under emission standards, followed by taxes and performance
standards, i.e., (=Q)S < (=Q)T = (=Q)PS < (=Q)NR : Again, this ranking is explained by the
signicant e¤ect of emission standards on the emission intensity of large rms.
When it comes to welfare e¤ects, Table 3 provides the values of a welfare indicator equal to
aggregate prots of active rms under the di¤erent policy instruments. In calculating our indicator
in the case of taxes, we sum back aggregate tax payments as they only represent a transfer between
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rms and the government. This is to say, they should not be considered as a reduction in aggregate
prots. Further, the aggregate prots in the case of emission standards correspond to the weighted
average of the prots of those rms for which the standard is not binding and those for which the
standard is binding. Two factors determine the observed di¤erences in aggregate prots: (i) the cost
of compliance of the di¤erent environmental policies and (ii) the di¤erent number of rms exiting
the market after the implementation of each environmental policy. Our numerical example provides
the following ranking: WINR > WIPS > WIT > WIES : This means that performance standards
lead to higher aggregate prots, followed by emission taxes and emission standards. The fact that
emission standards lead to lower prots is interesting since rms are not required to pay for their
emissions in this case. However, the fact that the regulation signicantly a¤ects the choice of inputs
and restricts rms with the highest energy e¢ ciency implies that this policy has the most negative
e¤ects on aggregate prots, though it impacts small rms to a lower extent. The extent to which our
welfare indicator corresponds to actual welfare depends on the social cost of emissions. If we would
assume, for example, that the cost of emissions is given by the tax (and that the marginal damage
is constant), the welfare under taxes would be the largest, followed by performance standards and
emission standards.
In order to illustrate Propositions 1, 2, and 3, we calculate the percentage gap in prots under each
policy instrument vis-a-vis no regulation, i.e., ji =
NRi  ji
NRi
, _ j = T; S; PS. As we can see in Figure
2, in relative terms, emission standards are much more stringent for larger rms than for smaller rms.
As expected, taxes and performance standards impose a higher cost to smaller rms. Moreover, under
performance standards large rms lose a smaller part of their prots (vis-a-vis no regulation) than
under emission taxes. As discussed before, this is explained by the fact under taxes rms have to pay
for all the emissions they release, while in the case of performance standards emissions below the level
imposed by the standard are free of charge.
Finally, in Table 3 we also present some numerical results for the two technology options. In
particular, we compute the thresholds ^
S
, ^
T
; and ^
PS
. Since the adoption of these technologies
implies an investment cost for the rms, only those rms whose surplus exceeds the investment cost
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Figure 2: Percentage reduction in rm is prots under environmental policy vis-a-vis no regulations.
will be able to invest. However, as expected, our simulations indicate that ^
S
> ^
T
> ^
PS
implying
that rms are most likely to invest in the emissions-saving technology under emission standards.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we study the e¤ects of the choice of policy instruments on the size distribution of rms.
We have shown that each regulation a¤ects rms of heterogeneous size di¤erently, favoring either
small or large rms. For instance, compared with taxes or performance standards, uniform emission
standards are much more stringent for larger rms which despite using the output that generates
emissions less intensively emit more than small rms in absolute terms. Moreover, we have shown
that a di¤erent number of rms go out of business under di¤erent policy instruments.
To sum up, the internalization of the social cost coming from the polluting activity of rms leads
to lower production levels for each "type" of rm. Emission taxes a¤ect small rms with signicantly
low surpluses (needed to cover the xed costs) the most, as the use of energy now becomes more
expensive. Emission standards a¤ect the most those large rms for which the standard is binding.
These rms would have to distort their choice of inputs signicantly as well as reduce their production
and prots in order to comply with the standard. Finally, performance standards favor large rms
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that produce high levels of output and do not nd the regulation so restrictive. Moreover, compared
with the other two policy instruments, they lead to a higher output (though at the expense of higher
emissions). Last but not least, assuming that rms can invest in two di¤erent technologies, a neutral
technology and an emission-saving-biased technology, we show that emission standards favor the use
of emissions-saving technologies the most.
The fact that each regulation a¤ects the size distribution di¤erently has important welfare con-
sequences. In our setting, the underlying size distribution of rms in the industry is the result of
the existence of heterogeneity in available physical capital with respect to energy intensity. Any en-
vironmental policy introducing regulatory asymmetries favoring small rms might have signicant
detrimental e¤ects on total output and total welfare, yet it might also lead to reduced emissions and
help preserve small businesses, which might be desirable because of antitrust of other non-economic
reasons. Alternatively, one could exempt smaller rms from the regulation, though this might cre-
ate additional distortions and discontinuities on the size distribution - an interesting issue for future
research.
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Appendix A
Proposition 1
Note that Ti =
NRi  Ti
NRi
= 1  Ti
NRi
. Di¤erentiating Ti with respect to i leads to:
@Ti
@i
=
Ti
@NRi
@i
  NRi @
T
i
@i
NRi
2 : (A1)
Di¤erentiating equations (9) and (13) with respect to i and replacing in (A1) leads to:
@Ti
@i
=


1    
"
Ti

NRi + F
  NRi Ti + F 
i

NRi
2
#
; (A2)
which simplies to:
@Ti
@i
=  


1    

F
i
Ti
NRi
< 0: (A3)
Proposition 2
Note that Si =
NRi  Si
NRi
= 1  Si
NRi
. Di¤erentiating Si with respect to i leads to:
@Si
@i
=
h
Si
@NRi
@i
  NRi @
S
i
@i
i

NRi
2 : (A4)
Di¤erentiating equations (9) and (29) with respect to i and replacing in (A4) leads to:
@Si
@i
=
264
h

1  
i
Si [
NR
i +F ]
i
 
h

1 
i
NRi [
S
i +z[
 1]+F ]
i
NRi
2
375 ; (A5)
which simplies to:
@Si
@i
=


1    
264
h
pi

 1

w 
i 1
1    z  1
i
NR
i
375   
1    

F
i
Si
NRi
: (A6)
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The rst term in brackets on the RHS of equation (A6) corresponds to the regulatory asymmetry
e¤ect (RA), which captures the fact that emission standards distort the emission intensity of larger
rms the most.
Adding and substracting
h
1
1  
i
NRi

Si + z

 1

+ F

to equation (A6) yields:
@Si
@i
=

i

NRi
2
2664
h
1
1  
i 
Si

NRi + F
  NRi Si + z  1+ F 
+
h
1
1  
i
NRi

Si + z

 1

+ F
  h 11  iNRi Si + z  1+ F 
3775 :
Or:
@Si
@i
=
1
i

NRi
2  1    
 
  F NRi   Si + NRi z  1+  1  

NRi

Si + z

 1

+ F

:
@Si
@i
is positive if:
 >
F

NRi   Si

+ NRi z

 1

NRi

Si + z

 1

+ F
 [1  ] : (A7)
Note that
F [NRi  Si ]+NRi z[ 1]
NRi [Si +z[ 1]+F ]
< 1. Hence, the constraint in (A7) should be consistent with the
condition  < 1   since F [
NR
i  Si ]+NRi z[ 1]
NRi [Si +z[ 1]+F ]
is something smaller than 1:
For the concavity condition to hold we need:
 <
1  
2
: (A8)
Combining conditions (A7) and (A8) yields:
F

NRi   Si

+ NRi z

 1

NRi

Si + z

 1

+ F
 [1  ] <  < 1  
2
:
Then the two conditions will hold simultaneously if and only if:
F

NRi   Si

+ NRi z

 1

NRi

Si + z

 1

+ F
 < 1
2
: (A9)
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Equation (A9) can be represented as:
2F

NRi   Si

+ 2NRi z

 1

< NRi

Si + z

 1

+ F

:
Or:
0 < NRi

Si   z

 1
  F + 2FSi ;
which always holds since Si  z

 1

+ F .
Hence,
F [NRi  Si ]+NRi z[ 1]
NRi [Si +z[ 1]+F ]
< 12 and
@Si
@i
> 0. This is to say, the RA is larger than the SE
e¤ect implying that emission standards reduce the prots of larger rms by a larger percentage than
those for smaller rms.
Proposition 3
Di¤erentiating PSi with respect to i leads to:
@PSi
@i
=
PSi
@NRi
@i
  NRi @
PS
i
@i
NRi
2 : (A11)
Di¤erentiating equations (9) and (38) with respect to i and replacing in (A11) leads to:
@PSi
@i
=


1    
"
PSi

NRi + F
  NRi PSi + F 
i

NRi
2
#
; (A12)
which simplies to:
@PSi
@i
=  


1    

F
i
PSi
NRi
< 0: (A13)
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Appendix B
The emission standard is binding for some of the rms belonging to the upper part of the distrib-
ution
h
NR0 ;

i
: In particulat, b1 > NR0 if:
2664 h


h  
h
T0
ih
h
  NR0
i h
NR0
i 
1  
  1
3775 > bz :
Since h > 1;


h  
h
T0
ih
>
h
  NR0
i
, and
h
NR0
i 
1  
< 1, it is easy to show that for
reasonable values of b ; this inequality holds. In our numerical example: h 1:67[1 0:13]
[1 0:26][0:26]0:66   1
i
>
0:125 ) 3:8 > 0:125: It is clear that even if the tax would double the price of energy, the inequality
would still hold.
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